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Let ZFI,(ZFI,-) be intuitionistic ZF set theory formulated with Replacement 
(resp. Collection). It is known that if ZFI, proves a sentence 3.r.4(1), then there is a 
formula C(z) so that ZFI, proves 3!zC(z) and 3.u(C(x) A A(x)), the existence 
property. It is shown that ZFIc does not have the existence property, and thus 
ZFI, s ZFI,. This remains true even if one adds Dependent Choice and all true 
2’, sentence of ZF. It is known that ZF and ZFI,- have the same provably recursive 
functions. It is also shown that this is not true for ZFI,. and ZFI,. ‘c: 1985 Academic 
Press. Inc 
It is known that most considered theories T in Heyting’s predicate 
calculus with equality have the existence property: if T proves a sentence 
3xA(x), then there is a formula C(z) with exactly z free, so that T proves 
3!&(z) and 3x(C(x) A A(x)). In classical logic, Zermelo set theory, ZF, 
and ZFC are known not to have the existence property. In particular, 
Feferman [3] and Levy [14] gave forcing extensions which show the 
failure of the existence property for Z7: sets. Nevertheless, one has the 
fragment of the existence property as a consequence of the uniformization 
property for 2: sets. This is important in point-set topology and descriptive 
set theory [ 151, where given a definable relation, one wants a definable 
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function with the same domain. ZF+ Projective Determinacy has the pro- 
jective existence property (with A(x), C(z) projective). Kunen observes that 
an extension of ZF has the existence property iff it proves V= OD. 
Freyd [6] proved the category-theoretic equivalent of the existence 
property for various free categories. 
Going back to intuitionistic theories, let us conveniently consider the 
language with E only, where x = y is defined as Vz(z E x ~1 z E y). Consider 
the following axioms of set theory: (1) Extensionality, (2) Pairing, (3) 
Separation, (4) Infinity, (5) Union, (6) Power Set, and (7) E-induction 
(because Regularity implies Excluded Middle [ 161). 
Let ZFZ, be the result of adding (the scheme of) Replacement: 
and let ZFZ, be the result of adding (the scheme of) Collection to (l)-(7): 
3u.vxEu.(3yA(x,y)-,3yEu.A(x,y)), 
or, equivalently as a scheme (by Separation): 
VxEa.3yA(x,y)~3u.vx~a.3y~u.A(.~,y). 
Clearly, Collection proves Replacement. In classical logic, the converse 
holds as well. 
It is a joint result of the first author and Myhill [16] that ZFI, has the 
existence property (by an extension of the Kleene slash [7]). Only a very 
restricted version, namely the numerical existence property is known for 
ZFI, (i.e., if a sentence 3x E w. A(x) is provable, then there is a numeral fi 
so that A(n) is provable). It was shown by a kind of recursive realizability 
by Beeson [ 11. 
On the other hand, Gijdel’s negative interpretation goes through for 
Collection, showing that ZFI, is equiconsistent with classical ZF set theory 
[S]. Furthermore, ZFI, and ZF have the same provably recursive 
functions [9]. By the work of D. Scott, Fourman, and Grayson, ZFZ, suf- 
fices to interpret (any bounded fragment of) ZFZ, in any Heyting-valued 
model, indeed in any Grothendieck topos [4, 12,5]. The same holds again 
for various versions of recursive realizability [7, 11. None of the counter- 
parts of these results are known for ZFI,. In particular, it is not known 
whether ZFI, is equiconsistent with ZFI, + “Every f E ww is recursive,” 
Recently, Goodman suggested that Kripke models might show that 
ZFZ, augmented with a unary predicate symbol does not prove ZFZ, 
augmented with the same unary predicate symbol. We use Kripke models 
here in a simpler way to show that ZFI, does not have the existence 
property. Therefore, ZFZ, does not prove ZFI,. 
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This basic construction, due to the first author, is given in Section 1. Sec- 
tion 2 contains joint work on a considerable strengthening of the basic 
result, showing that even ZFI, with Dependent Choice and all classically 
true C, sentences of ZF still does not prove Collection. This is accom- 
plished by introducing the concept of relative existence property (due to 
the second author). It is the unique definability from parameters satisfying 
finitely many formulae of a certain class. This fails for Collection, but holds 
(in a weak form) for Replacement. 
In Section 3 (due to the first author), it is proved that ZFZ, and ZFI, do 
not have the same provably recursive functions. 
We refer the reader now to [ 13,2, 171 for a body of knowledge in set 
theory, model theory, and recursion theory used especially in Sections 2 
and 3. In Section 2 we shall also refer to the methods developed in [lo]. 
1. COLLECTION LACKS THE EXISTENCE PROPERTY 
Our argument takes place in ZFC + Con(ZFC). Let JV be a countable 
model of ZFC + V = L. Let A be the least ordinal in J1/’ that is greater than 
all definable ordinals in ,Y‘ (cf. remark at the end of this section). Collapse 
A by forcing, to make i countable. Let A be the resulting forcing exten- 
sion. In ,K, wi is greater than i. Thus we can work in ZFC + 
Con(1 ordinal definable in V, greater than all ordinals definable in L). 
Now let A!* be the structure defined as follows. Elements of A’* are all 
pairs (~,y), where x,.~EA&. Let R((x,y), (u, v)) iff A~(x,y)~ 
U. (A%!*, R) satisfies all axioms of ZF except Extensionality and Power Set. 
Let = be the equivalence relation on A’* given by (Vc)(R(c, a)+-+ R(c, b)). 
Let F: A’* -+ .4’” be a definable function such that 
(1) R(x, y) implies F(x) E F( y), 
(2) F maps each equivalence class [x] w.r.t. = one-to-one onto 
(--~,,~‘Itly(R(y,x)~F(.~)~~‘)j. 
Thus the range of F is as large as possible, subject to the constraint of 
(1). Such an F is unique up to isomorphism and is defined by transtinite 
recursion on the rank of elements of AZ’*. 
We now form the following Kripke structure. There are two moments 
1 < 2. The objects at both moments are the elements of A* If A(x, ,..., x,) 
is a formula of ZFI with exactly X, ,..., x,, free, we let 
2 IF A(x, ,..., x,) iff~‘!=A(F(x,),..., Ftx,)), 
with the ordinary abuse of notation. Forcing at 1 is defined by 
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1 IkYEX iff R(Y, xl, 
1 Itk B iff 1 It A and 1 jb B, 
lItA v B iff 1 11 A or 1 11 B, 
1 IkA-rB iff 1 11 A implies 1 jk B, and &“+=A + B, 
1 It!lx.A(x) iff 1 ItA(x)forsomexE,A*, 
1 It Vx.A(x) iff 1 It A(x) and N+A(F(x)), for all x E A*. 
One readily shows by induction on the complexity of A(x,,..., x,) that 
1 II- 4x,,..., x,) implies 2 IF A(xr,..., x,). 
LEMMA 1.1. All axioms of ZFZ, are forced at 1. In particular, 
1 I~Vz(zExozEy) iffx=y. 
Proof: This semantics is a special case of Kripke models [20], but it 
can easily be verified directly that Heyting’s predicate calculus is forced 
at 1. 
Extensionality. Vz(z E x HZ E y ) -+ (A(x)ctA(y)). Let 1 [~VZ(ZEX~ 
z E y), i.e., for all z, R(z, x) iff R(z, y), and F(z) E F(x) iff F(z)E F(y). 
Because F is onto, F(x) = F( y). Because F is one-to-one on equivalence 
classes, x = y. Then the conclusion is forced. 
Pairing. 3x( y~x A ZEX). Obvious. 
Separation. Zlx.Vy(y~xcry~z A A(y)). Consider U= (uEF(~)IA(u)} 
in N, and let x’ E A!* be such that for each y E A?*, R( y, x’) iff R(y, z) 
and 1 /k A( y). Because R( y, x’) implies F(y) E 1.4, let XE [x’] be such that 
F(x) = u. 
Infinity. 3x. 3y E x. Vz E x. 30 E x. z E u. Consider w  in JV and successively 
choose 0, I,..., n” ,..., in A’* so that F(E) =n, each new. Let x’EA%!* be such 
that R( y, x’) iff y = 6, some n E w. Let x E [x’] be such that F(x) = CO. 
Union. 3x.Vy.Vu(y~u A UEU+~EX). Let X/E&* be such that 
R( y, x’) if R( y, u) and R(u, u), some u E ,I*. Then R( y, x’) implies 
F(y) E F(U), so let x E [x’] be such that F(x) = U F(u). 
Power Set. 3x.Vy(Vz E y.z E u 4 y E x). This is rather delicate because 
Power Set does not hold in A’*. We need, however, only x E A* so that 
for all ye A%‘*, F(y) G F(u) implies F(y) E F(x), and that F(y) c F(u) and 
Vz(R(z, y) -+ R(z, u)) imply R( y, x). Recall that F maps [y] l-l onto 
(w E JV) Vz(R(z, y) + F(z) E w)}. Suppose F(y) E F(u) and Vz(R(z, y) ---* 
R(z, u)); so we need consider only w  in the power set of F(U) in JV. Let 
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x’ E A* be a set of all such y, i.e., R( y, x’) iff F(y) z F(u) and Vz(R(z, y) + 
R(z, u)). Now choose XE [x’] so that F(x) is the power set of F(u) in X. 
Foundation. Qx(Qy E x.A( y) + ,4(x)) -+ Vxli(x). We wish to use Foun- 
dation w.r.t. formula 1 /- A(x); but this is not possible right away because 
the antecedent involves nested implication, and 1 IF B + C involves 
2 It B -+ C. Note, however, that because the antecedent is universal, if 1 
forces it, then so does 2; so VxA(x) is true in N by Foundation. Thus 
1 jkVyEx.A(y) is equivalent to Vy(R(y,x)+ 1 iFA(y and 
1 11 (Qy E x. A( y) + A(x)) is equivalent to 
Use Foundation w.r.t. formula 1 It A(x) to get 1 IF A(x) for each x E A*. 
Collection. 3u.Vx E u(3y.A(x. y) -+3y~u.A(.~ y)). Let u’E&?* be such 
that for each x E ,M*, R(-X, u) implies 
3.1 It Al-? Y) + WR(Y, 0’) A 1 It A(-? y)), 
by Collection w.r.t. formula 1 It A(x, y). By Collection in JV, let w  E M be 
such that for each x E M*, F(X) E F(u) implies 
~Y.A(FL~), F(Y))-+ ~Y(F(Y)E w  A A(W), F(Y))). 
Recall that F maps [v’] 1 - 1 onto {s E JV” I Vy(R( y, u’) + F(y) E S) > and 
choose IIE[U’] so that F(u)=F(u’)uw. 1 
LEMMA 1.2. Let Dee be the decidability axiom Vx. Vy(x E y  v  x P y). 
For any formula A, let A* be the result qf replacing every atomic subformula 
B of A by B v Dec. Then 1 lk A* iff Jl* IF A. Moreover, 2 it A*. 
ProoJ: Let XE J%‘* be such that for no YE 4?* do we have R( y, x). 
Recall that F maps [x] l-1 onto 4”. Thus 1 It+ Dee, i.e., 1 It+ (I*). Of 
course 2 It Dee, so 2 It A*, any A. Also, 1 Ik ((u E u) v Dee) iff 1 /- u E u, 
i.e., R(u, u), i.e., ,k’*ku E u. Proceed by induction on the complexity of A. 
Only -+ and V are interesting. 1 jk (A -+ B)*, i.e., 1 IF (A* + B*) iff 1 IF A* 
implies 1 IF B*, and 2 IF (A + B)*. The second condition holds, and by 
induction hypothesis, 1 IF A* iff JZ*~ A, 1 IF B* iff A*+ B. Thus 
1 IF (A* + B*) iff -k’*p (A + B). V is treated similarly. m 
LEMMA 1.3. Suppose 1 Ik 3!xA(x), where A has no other free oariable. 
Then for the unique x E Jt’* such that 1 It A(x), it is the case that F(x) is the 
unique solution to A in JV’. In particular, rk(x) is bounded by some definable 
ordinal of N. 
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Proof 3!xA(x) says 3x(,4(x) A V&4(y) + Vz(z E xtrz my)). By 
Lemma 1.1, 1 j~Vz(z~xtrz~y) iff x=y, thus 1 It3!xA(x) indeed implies 
that there is a unique XE JZ* so that 1 IF A(x). Now 1 IF B(y) implies 
2 I/- B(F( y)) for any formula B, so 2 I/- 3!xA(x), and on the other hand 
2 /-A(F(x)) for the unique XE&* so that 1 Ik A(x). The second part of 
the statement follows because rk(x) < rk(F(x)). 1 
LEMMA 1.4. Let A(y) be a formula stating “y is an uncountable ordinal,” 
e.g., “y is transitive, linearly ordered by E, and for some set x satisfying the 
axiom of Infinity, there is no l-l onto map from x to y.” Then there is no 
formula C(z) with exactly z free so that 
ZFZct--3!zC(z) A 3v(C(v) A (3y.A*(y)+3y~v.A*(y))). 
Proof Suppose there is such a formula C(z). Note that 
3~(3y.A*(y)+3y~v.A*(y)) 
is an instance of Collection (with u a singleton), and thus forced at 1, by 
Lemma 1.1. Because &‘*kEly.A(y), we see that 1 It3y.A*(y) by 
Lemma 1.2, and thus 1 IF 3y~v.A*( y). Again by Lemma 1.2, &*bA( y) 
for some y E A* with R( y, v). Therefore rk( y) < rk(v), so it is bounded by 
a definable ordinal < Iz of JP” (Lemma 1.3), that has been made countable 
in J*. On the other hand, y is an uncountable ordinal. 1 
Remark. All we need is 1> rk(v), where v is definable by the formula 
C(u). 
We thus have 
THEOREM 1.1. Assume Con(.ZFC). Then ZFI, does not have the 
existence property. In particular, it does not have the existence property for 
some sentence of the form 
COROLLARY 1.1. There is an instance of Collection that is not provable in 
ZFZ, . 
Proof: ZFZ, has the existence property [16]. 1 
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2. ADDING DEPENDENT CHOICE AND ALL TRUE Z,-SENTENCES 
We consider the schema of Relativized Dependent Choice (RDC): 
A(,-) A Vx(Nx) - 3YLQY) A W%Y))) 
+ 3f(‘f is a function with domain w” A f(0) = 2 
A VXEW.(A(f(X)) A B(f(X),f(-y+ 1)))). 
Let C, be the collection of all classically true ,X’, sentences in the 
language of ZF. In this section we prove 
THEOREM 2.1. Let Con(ZFC + z:,). Then there is an instance of Collec- 
tion of the form 3v(3y.A( y) -+ 3y~ v.A( y)) that is not provable in ZFI, + 
RDC+C,. 
We first modify the Kripke structure given in Section 1 to show that 
ZFZc + RDC + 2, lacks even a weak form of the existence property that 
asserts definability in parameters satisfying finitely many conditions of a 
certain kind. Then we prove this weak form of the existence property for 
ZFI, + RDC + C, . 
The proofs of both facts are facilitated by 
LEMMA 2.1. Let o, be the collection of all true sentences of the form 
3.x G w  x w  .31! & o (“x is well founded” 
A “X and y are decidable” A A(x, y)), 
where A(x, y) is an arithmetic formula with parameters x, y, and where “x is 
well ,founded” is stated as the transfinite induction over x w.r.t. sets. “x is 
decidable” reads tin, m E co. ((n, m) E s v (n, m) & x), similarly for y. Then 
ZFZ, + RDC + C 1 = ZFZ, + RDC + o , . 
Remark. Decidability condition may be dropped. 
Proof Every true o,-sentence is intuitionistically equivalent to a true ,X,- 
sentence, because w  is A,-deiinable, and ‘&x is well founded” can be refor- 
mulated as “there is a function f into ordinals such that (n, m) E x implies 
f(n) <f(m).” Function f is defined by transtinite recursion on x. For the 
other direction, it is crucial to observe that one does not need an 
intuitionistic proof that every true ,?Y’,-sentence is equivalent to a true or- 
sentence. Rather, it suffices to show that every true Cl-sentence is provable 
in ZFZ, + c,. We use the Godel condensation argument. Given a true z,- 
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sentence B, use the reflection principle in ZFC for B A Extensionality, and 
let (y, x) be a countable well-founded extensional structure so that 
( y, x ) k B. The existence of x, y is a true at-sentence that implies B in 
ZFZ, by the Mostowski transitive collapse. 1 
LEMMA 2.2. Let A(y) be the formula stating “y is transitive, linearly 
ordered by E, and there is an uncountable ordinal x such that there is no l-l 
onto map from x to y.” Then there are no true o,-sentences 3ri.3si. Bi(ri, s,), 
1 < i 6 n, and a formula C(z, rl, sl,..., r,,, s,) with the free variables as 
exhibited, so that ZFI, + RDC + c, proves 
-+ 3!zC(z, r, s) A 3v(C(v, r, s)) 
A (3y.A*(y)+3y~v.A*(y)) (t) 
ProoJ: We modify the Kripke structure given in Section 1 so that RDC 
is Kripke-forced at moment 1. Further analysis of the structure will show 
that every true rr,-sentence is Kripke-forced at moment 1. By the 
Levy-Shoenfield Absoluteness Lemma, we can have a countable model of 
ZFC + ( V= L) + (TV at moment 2. Again, let 1 be an ordinal > ot greater 
than any definable ordinal. Now, however, collapse I to w1 by o-closed 
forcing, so every new w-sequence of constructible sets is constructible. 
Build the nonextensional structure M* at moment 1 and the transition 
function F as in Section 1. Let us check RDC. Assume its antecedent is 
Kripke-forced at 1, in particular 1 11 A( ) z , and for each x in M*, 1 It A(x) 
implies 1 IF A(y) and 1 IF B(x, y) for some y in M*. Choose a sequence 
x0, x 1 >.-., xnt...1 so that x0 = z and 1 It A(x,), 1 Ik B(x,, x,, I ), each n. The 
internal o in the Kripke structure was defined in the proof of Lemma 1.1. 
by choosing 0, I,..., fi ,..., in M* so that F(fi) =n, all n, and F({ii},) = co. 
Choose ordered pairs (fi, x,)* in M* so that F((n’, x,)*) = (n, F(x,)). 
Now we want to choose a copy J in M* of the sequence ( (6, x,)* >” so 
that r;(f)= {(n, Jlx,))},. W e can certainly get F(f) to include this set, 
because for any x in M*, F(x) satisfies Vy(R( y, x) + F(y) E F(x)) by 
definition of F (Section 1). To finish the proof, we must show that 
( (n, F(x,) ) }n is constructible. This holds because we collapsed Iz to w1 by 
o-closed forcing. 
Now let B be a true at-sentence. By the Levy-Shoenfield Absoluteness 
Lemma, B is true in L, and because it is upward absolute, it is true in the 
forcing extension. Choose copies x0, y, in M* so that F(x,) E w x w, 
F( yo) E w  are witnesses for B at 2. 1 [I( x is well founded), by an argument 
similar to the validation of Foundation in Lemma 1.1. 1 11 A(x,, yo) 
because A(x, y) is arithmetic. Note that 1 It- “x0, y, are decidable.” 
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Furthermore, 1 lb “x c o x o and y G o are decidable” requires that 
R(fi, y) iff n E F( y), and similarly for x. Assume 1 It (t), with (f) as in the 
statement of Lemma 2.2. Because all true o,-sentences are Kripke-forced at 
moment 1, there are some r,, si E M*, 1 d id n so that 
1 IF A (‘IT* s w  x w  and s, 2 o are decidable”) 
i=I 
and thus 
1 Ik3!~C(~,r,s) A %(C(u,r,s) A (3??.A*(,v)~~~E21.A*(c’))). 
Transition function F has to be the identity on each r,, sjr 1 6 i 6 n. By the 
Kondo-Addison Uniformization Theorem (at 2), we can choose ri, si, 
I < id II definable at 2. Now reason as in the proof of Lemma 1.4. 1 
LEMMA 2.3. Let 3xB(.x) he a sentence provable in ZFI, + RDC + 0,. 
Then there are true Q ,-sentences jr,. Is,. B,(r;, s,), 1 < i d n, and a formula 
Cl:, rI, .yl ,..., r,!, s,,) with aN,free variables exhibited, so that ZFI,. + RDC + 
0, proves 
,,s,)+ 3!d'(z, r, s) A 3x(C(x, r, s) A B(x)) . 
Remark. The conclusion of the lemma does not stipulate provability in 
ZFZ, + RDC + cr, 
ProoJ We follow the methods of [lo]. Suppose ZFZ,+ RDC+a, 
proves a sentence M?(X). Let TC, be a finite fragment that proves 3xB(x). 
In particular, TC, involves only finitely many true o,-sentences, say k of 
them. Build the bounded theory TCb as in [IO], but adding also a new 
kind of set constants c,, cl,..., elk together with the new axioms requiring 
that c2, , , c2Z witness the ith true or-sentence in TC’,, together with finitely 
many true conditions (obtained from its subformulae) allowing each of the 
k true a,-sentences of TC, to be slashed. If /? is a bounded fragment of the 
collection of all true o,-sentences, together with the conditions on 
parameters just described, let CT(b) require that “Every f: w  + o is recur- 
sive in b.” Choose p large enough so that TCO slashes TC, in the 
metatheory ZFZ, + RDC + /I + CT(b). Applying 1945realizability relative 
to fi, we obtain a bounded fragment y 2 /3 so that ZFZ, + RDC + y proves 
that for some set constant T, TCb proves B(z). By a semantic interpretation 
of TCb, ZFZc + RDC + y proves that there is a term 5 (in finitely many 
parameters) so that B(t). Use q-realizability relative to y to obtain a 
(godelnumeral of a) term 5 (in finitely many parameters) so that 
ZFI, + RDC + S proves B(t), with 6 3 y. The well-foundedness conditions 
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in y are q-realized as in [20, p. 1991 (cf. also [ 1, 111). Finally, the con- 
clusion of the lemma follows by compactness. 1 
Proof of Theorem 2.1. Let A( y ) be as in Lemma 2.2. The sentence 
3u(3yA*( y) + 3y E v. A*( y)) is provable in ZFZ,. We claim that it is not 
provable in ZFZ, + RDC + 2,. By Lemma 2.1, it suffices to show that it is 
not provable in ZFI, + RDC + (T,. But its provability in ZFZ, + RDC + o1 
would make Lemma 2.2 contradict Lemma 2.3. 1 
Remarks. (1) Because VxVy(x my v x & y) is n,, ZFI, + 17, = 
ZFI, + 17, = ZF + I7,. One cannot even add all (classically) true sentences 
about the power set of {0}, because the Separation would imply 
VxVy(x~y v x d y). By the same reason, we need so many copies of (0) 
at moment 1 in our Kripke structures. 
(2) Let TI be the collection of sentences expressing transfinite induc- 
tion over each (true) primitive recursive well-ordering. Let MP be the 
schema 
Vx,y~o(A(x,y) v lA(x,y))~Vx~~(ll3y~o.A(x,1’) 
+~Y~~.A(x,Y)), 
where A(x, y) is any formula. Both TI and MP are self-slashing, and both 
hold in our Kripke structure. Therefore, all the results of this section 
extend to TI and MP. 
3. REPLACEMENT AND COLLECTION Do NOT HAVE 
THE SAME PROVABLY RECURSIVE FUNCTIONS 
ZFZ, and ZF are equiconsistent [8], and prove the same @ sentences 
[9]. Here we prove, assuming Con(ZFC), that every provably recursive 
function (i.e., a provable fl sentence) of ZFI, is a provably recursive 
function of a particular weak fragment of ZFC. We still do not know the 
proof-theoretic strength of ZFZ,. We conjecture that ZF proves the con- 
sistency of ZFIR. 
Let T be the theory in classical logic in the language of ZF, consisting of 
the axioms 
(1) Extensionality, 
(2) Pairing, 
(3) Full Separation, 
(4) Infinity, 
(5) Union, 
(6) Power Set, 
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(7) Full Foundation, 
(8) Axiom of Choice, 
(9) Every well-ordering is isomorphic to an ordinal, 
(10) There is a cumulative hierarchy on every ordinal. 
Let T = T+ Con(ZFC). Because T’ is obtained from T by adding a true 
fl sentence, provably recursive functions of T and T’ are the same. Let T” 
be T’ + “There is no fixed point of the 1 function.” Note that by trun- 
cation, T” is conservative over T’ for arithmetic sentences. 
THEOREM 3.1. Ever?) prenex arithmetic consequence of ZFK, is provable 
in T’. In particular, every provably recursive ,function qf ZFI, is a provahlj 
recursive function of T. 
Working in T”, we give a two-moment Kripke structure for ZFZ, The 
key idea is that it suffices for Replacement to hold only in the model at 
moment 2 to be Kripke-forced at moment 1. The model at moment 2 is 
built from a model of T” by using indiscernibles. Similar techniques have 
been utilized in [ 18, 191 using large cardinals, but with stronger con- 
clusions. The construction here is the first author’s version of the construc- 
tion of Kunen that uses only Con(ZFC) to show the existence of q-like 
models of ZFC, for any singular cardinal cp. 
LEMMA 3.1. T” proves the existence of a model of ZFC + V = L that is a 
proper class and whose bounded initial segments form sets. 
Proqf: Let Mk T”. We need a model N of ZFC+ V= L with o blocks 
of u-sequences of ordinals such that 
(a) For each i, any finite sequence of ordinals ~1, ,..., a,,, below the sup 
of the block i, and any finite sequence u,,,..., uiA from the block i + 1 and 
above 
for any formula 4 of the given bounded complexity, and any finite sequence 
vi ,,..., v,, such that Iv.,,1 = 1 ui,I and the elements of the finite sequences u,, 
and vjz lie in the same block, say jj, in which they are strictly increasing. 
(b) For any element a of any block, L, is an elementary substructure 
of N w.r.t. formulae of the given bounded complexity. 
Now take the model generated by these o blocks of w-sequences. Then 
their sup is cofinal and the properties (a), (b) are preserved, because they 
are 1st order properties. Stretch the block 1 to N, block 2 to aEtO, block 3 
to h,o’ etc. The model K thus obtained satisfies the desired properties. 
We construct N as follows. Let S= {a 1 L,< L w.r.t. formulae of the 
12 FRIEDMAN AND SCEDB~V 
given complexity}. S is closed unbounded. Let a, be the ath element of S. 
Choose o increasing elements h,, bz,..., as follows. Let 6, = awcu, 
b, = ah ,,..., b,, , = ah ,,..,, Observe that ISn(bi, bi+,)l + bi. Now choose IZ- 
tuples from each of k sets of the form S n (bj, bf + , ) as follows. By induction 
on k, as in the Erdbs-Rado Theorem (for n-tuples for arbitrary partitions) 
for each o-sequence of subsets A, G (bj- ,, b;) with 1 Ai1 = Ith cardinal 
beyond bi- 1, there exist subsets Bis Ai such that 1 BjJ = (I-f(k))th car- 
dinal beyond bi- 1, and elements of Bjs are indiscernibles for (n, k)-tuples 
w.r.t. formulae of the given complexity. Here f: o + w  is a slow-growing 
function, say, f(k) z k*n’. 1 
Let Mk T”, and let K be a model of ZFC + V= L as described in 
Lemma 3.1. Within M, define the nonextensional version M*, and the 
transition function F: M* + K, as in Section 1. Define the Kripke structure 
whose objects are elements of M*, so that 1 IF x my iff R( y, x), and 
2 Iky~x iff KkF(y)eF(x). 
LEMMA 3.2. T” proves that 1 IF Replacement. 
Proof: M*, K, and F are defined in M. Suppose 1 IF Vx E a.I!yA(x, y). 
Then for each XE A4* with R(x, a), there exists a unique y E M* with 
1 Ik A(x, y), and for each F(x) E F(a) there exists a unique WE K with 
K+A(F(x), IV). As in Lemma 1.3, w  = F(y). By Replacement in K, let 
VE K be such that K~=V~E F(a).3z~v.A(s, 2). By Lemma 3.1, 
o?~M*lF(.d }. E v IS a set in M, and hence an element of M*, along with 
its copies. By the properties of F, there exists its copy u with v = F(u). Then 
1 /~vxEa.3yEu.A(x,y). 1 
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Suppose ZFI, proves Qx, E w. Q.Y~ E w.... 
Qx,, E w. A, where A is quantifier-free. Then this sentence is Kripke-forced at 
moment 1 in (M*, J K), and so this sentence holds in M. 1 
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